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ARGUMENT 
I. APPELLEES HAVE FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE, 
Appellees' Brief fails to conform to the provisions of 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 24. Appellees have 
failed to marshal the evidence, as required by Subparagraph 
(a) (9) . Appellees' emotionally charged rhetoric leaves no 
room for Appellees to marshal the evidence and present to 
this Court the basis upon which the Trial Court made its 
various findings and decisions. Appellees' Argument lacks 
the citations to the record, as required by Subparagraph 
(a) (9) to show that the arguments were properly preserved 
for appeal. 
The failure to marshal the evidence is fatal to each of 
the issues raised by the Appellees on cross appeal. The 
issues raised by the cross appeal are contained in Argument 
nos. Ill, IV, V and VI of Appellees' brief. 
In support of Argument III, Appellees' only reference 
to the record is a reference to fact no. 39 in their 
statement of facts. As discussed below, the fact only 
contains a citation to a verbal exchange during a 
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deposition. There is no citation to the record relative to 
the actual substance of Appellees' cross appeal. In fact, 
the Trial Court provided a reason for its failure to award 
fees relative to the motion in question. Because of the 
Appellees' failure to have the hearing transcribed or 
otherwise present the record, this Court has no means of 
evaluating the reasoning for the Trial Court's decision. 
Appellees' brief contains no references to the record 
in Argument IV. 
In support of Argument V, Appellees' brief contains two 
references to the record. However, both citations are to 
the trial proceedings. Argument V concerns the issue of 
whether the Trial Court erred in granting summary judgment 
as to the Cambells' counterclaims. Summary judgment was 
granted long before the matter went to trial. Appellees 
provide no citation to the briefs addressing summary 
judgment or to the oral argument where the Trial Court: 
decided the issue. The Appellees have not established that 
they raised the present arguments at the trial court level 
as needed to preserve such arguments for appeal, and 
Argument V certainly includes argument made for the first 
time on appeal! 
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In support of Argument VI, Appellees' brief references 
two trial exhibits attached to its brief. Again, there are 
no references to the record from which this Court might 
ascertain what was presented to the Trial Court or what the 
reasoning of the Trial Court may have been in denying the 
Campbell's motion for directed verdict. 
On June 19, 2 006, this Court of Appeals issued an Order 
striking the Appellees' brief for failure to comply with 
Rule 24. Appellees were given ten days in which to file a 
compliant brief. As a result of the Appellees' substantial 
failure to comply with the requirements of Rule 24(a) (9), 
Appellees' Brief should be disregarded and Appellees should 
not be permitted oral argument, particularly with regard to 
the issues raised by the Appellees on cross appeal. 
II, APPELLEES' STATEMENT OF FACTS IS IRRELEVANT. 
Appellees' Statement of Facts consists of 16 pages of 
largely irrelevant matters. The first three numbered facts, 
for example, indicates that the plaintiff owns rental 
property in Utah but does not live in Utah. Mrs. Myrah's 
state of residence is not an issue relevant to the appeal, 
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but Appellees' Brief is full of emotionally charged 
references, including such labels as xxabsentee landlord. " 
Appellees' Statement of the Case is indicative of the 
Appellees' use of emotionally charged hyperbole as a 
substitute for focus on the issues in the case. 
Appellees' Statement of Facts also refers to testimony 
that is contradicted by the express terms of the written 
lease agreements between the parties. As discussed in 
Argument II of the Brief of Appellant, the identification of 
the lease agreements was established by the Campbells' 
responses to requests for admission. There was no dispute 
as to the identity of the written lease agreements. Both 
lease agreements contained an integration clause. [R: 
Plaintiff's Exhibits 1 and 2.] Therefore, parole evidence 
introduced solely to contradict the express terms of the 
lease was improper. See Brief of the Appellant, pp. 14-19 
and 28. 
While Appellees' Statement of Facts introduces 
testimony that the premises were not clean during the time 
the premises were occupied by the Campbells, Appellees' fail 
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to marshal the evidence which established that each of the 
issues that arose after the lease was signed were 
appropriately remedied by the Landlord. For example, 
Michael Dalley from the Salt Lake County health department 
testified that he was the inspector with responsibility for 
the complaint that arose in September 1998, the first year 
of the lease. [R. 1847: pp. 214:20-25, 215:21-24.] He 
testified that all of the problems noted in his letter of 
September 14, 1998 were resolved after his meeting with Mrs. 
Myrah. [R. 1847: pp. 230:14-25, 232:4-233:10.] As a result 
of Appellees' failure to marshal the evidence, this Court 
cannot evaluate Appellees' contention that the evidence 
supported a finding other than that reached by the Trial 
Court. In this case, the Trial Court expressly found that 
the premises were habitable during the entire time of the 
both the first lease and the second lease. [R. 1629-34] 
Again, because the Trial Court made a finding of 
habitability, parole evidence was inadmissible to contradict 
the express terms of the lease stating that the premises 
were in good and clean condition at the commencement of the 
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first lease and one year later at the commencement of the 
second lease. See Brief of the Appellant, pp. 14-19 and 28. 
Appellees attempt to persuade this Court with their 
Statement of Facts that there was something wrong with the 
condition of the premises. However, while they note that 
they testified about various complaints they had with the 
premises, they do not answer the fundamental questions that 
would be relevant on appeal. For example, they fail to 
discuss that it was their responsibility under the express 
terms of the lease to maintain the premises in good 
condition. [R: Plaintiff's Exhibits 1 and 2.] If Michael 
Dalley from the Salt Lake County health department testified 
that the premises were up to code and in acceptable 
condition in September 1998 [R. 1847: pp. 230:14-25, 232:4-
233:10], then the condition of the premises must have 
worsened after his involvement. The express terms of the 
lease required the Campbells to maintain the premises in 
clean condition. If they took such good care of the 
premises, as they claim then the premises must have been 
very clean through the entire term of both leases 
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thereafter.1 Similarly, Appellees7 brief acknowledges in 
fact no. 3 6 that the carpet was replaced by Mrs. Myrah. The 
carpet was replaced in or about July 1998. [R. 1847: p. 
105:7-11.] Yet the Campbell's refuse to recognize that if 
the new carpet was filthy, that the lack of cleanliness 
could only be the result of their failure to clean it while 
they occupied the premises. See Brief of the Appellant, pp. 
31-33. 
Fact no. 3 9 is also worth mentioning. It is the only 
citation to the record relative to Appellee's counterclaim 
concerning the production of documents during discovery. It 
contains a citation to deposition testimony. Mrs. Myrah 
produced all responsive documents in her possession or 
Ironically, Appellee's cite the testimony of Bonnie 
Sackett for the contention that the premises never looked 
better than when they were occupied by the Campbell family. 
[R. 1847: p. 246:18-24.] See Appellee's Statement of Facts 
no. 34. However, this is the same lady who testified that 
she never entered the premises during the entire 23 months 
that the Campbells occupied the premises. [R. 1847: p. 
248:20-250:6, 252:7-13, 258:10-259:2.] This obvious lack of 
foundation for Mrs. Sackett's testimony generally was 
pointed out in the Brief of Appellant on page 30. 
Appellees' Brief contains no response with respect thereto 
or with respect to most of the substantive issues raised by 
Appellant. 
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control during the discovery process and there was no 
finding by the Trial Court to the contrary. This Court 
cannot make a finding to the contrary without even receiving 
the necessary information from the record. 
Ill, THE CENTRAL ISSUE FOR TRIAL WAS THE CONDITION IN WHICH 
THE CAMPBELLS LEFT THE PREMISES AT THE END OF THE LEASE, 
The claims to be adjudicated at trial included the rent 
due for April and June 2000, the utilities due and the 
damages associated with the cleaning and repair of the 
premises in June 2000 when the Campbells vacated the 
premises. The initial Rental Agreement was fully performed 
on June 30, 1999 at the expiration of its term and was not 
the subject of the litigation. The amounts due were all due 
pursuant to the Renewal Agreement that commenced July 1, 
1999. Except to the very limited extent that Court needed to 
assure itself that the premises were not unhabitable, the 
condition of the premises at any time prior to June 2000 was 
not an issue for trial. See Wade v. Job, 818 P. 2d 1006, 
1010 (Utah 1991) . Parole evidence was inadmissible to 
contradict the express provisions of the lease concerning 
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the condition of the premises at the outset of either the 
first lease or the second lease. See Id. 
In F.M.A. Financial Corp. v. Hansen Dairy, Inc., 617 
P.2d 327 (Utah 1980), cited by defendants, the Court 
addressed the delivery of a silo that had not been erected 
at the time the contract was entered into. Since the 
contract stated that delivery was made before the silo 
existed, the Court accepted parol evidence. 
In the present case, defendants received the premises 
prior to the commencement of each one-year lease term. Each 
contract expressly stated that the defendants received the 
premises and that the premises were in good condition. 
Because the defendants had resided in the premises for a 
full year and were intimately familiar with the condition of 
the premises before the commencement of the Renewal 
Agreement, to create and F.M.A. exception to the parole 
evidence rule in the present case would undermine the 
clearly expressed intent of the contract. To hold otherwise 
would entirely eliminate the parol evidence rule. 
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As discussed above, Michael Dalley from the Salt Lake 
County health department testified that the premises were up 
to code and in acceptable condition in September 1998. [R. 
1847: pp. 230:14-25, 232:4-233:10.] Appellees have spend a 
great deal of energy trying to make a case that the house 
was not up to code, but the evidence is simply to the 
contrary. Appellees also argue the applicability of the 
Utah Fit Premises Act without addressing their own failure 
to plead or meet the requirements for the application of 
such Act. 
This is an appropriate place to also address Appellees' 
Argument IV concerning the testimony of Carter Hill. Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 26 (a) (3) provides the 
requirements for disclosure of expert testimony. Rule 
26(a)(3)(A) expressly states, "A party shall disclose to 
other parties the identity of any person who may be used at 
trial to present evidence under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of 
the Utah Rules of Evidence." (Emphasis added.) As 
Appellees' brief appears to acknowledge, the Campbells did 
not provide an expert report relative to Mr. Hill. Without 
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authority, they argue that such a report was not required as 
a condition of allowing Mr. Hill to testify as an expert 
witness. Appellees also fail to cite any authority 
concerning the discretion of the trial court to receive the 
testimony of any party, particularly that of a purported 
expert. The record does establish that Mr. Hill last saw 
the property more than a year prior to the occupation of the 
property by the Campbells. [R. 1847: p.309:17-18.] Thus, 
even if he was qualified as an expert, his testimony was not 
relevant, since the condition of the home during the 
occupancy by the Campbells was not the same as it had been 
when Mr. Hill last saw the property. Moreover, Michael 
Dalley of the Salt Lake County Health Department examined 
the premises in September 1998. He testified that all 
health code matters were resolved at that time. [R. 1847: 
pp. 230:14-25, 232:4-233:10.] 
IV. THE CAMPBELL'S ARGUMENTS 
ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD. 
On page 23, Appellees state the elements of a prima 
facia case for breach of contract. Despite Appellees' 
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arguments, the record clearly supports the judgment entered 
against the Campbells. Particularly with regard to the 
Campbells motion for directed verdict, Appellees acknowledge 
that such a motion can only be granted when all of the 
evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party, was inadequate to support a verdict in favor 
of the non-moving party. Appellees clearly fail to 
understand their duty to marshal the evidence before making 
such an argument. 
First, there must be a contract. The record 
establishes that the two written lease agreements were 
admitted into evidence. They were authenticated by the 
parties through testimony and requests for admissions. [R. 
Plaintiff's Exhibits 1 and 2; 1847: pp. 22:11-22, 23:7-8; 
1848: pp. 563:18-564:7.] 
Second, there must be performance by the party seeking 
recovery. Again, the record establishes that the Campbells 
occupied the premises described by the lease agreements for 
a period of 23 months. [R. 1631.] There can be no dispute 
that some level of performance was provided. The Trial 
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Court found that the premises were habitable for the entire 
period of occupancy. [R. 1631.] The Appellees have not 
marshaled the evidence in support of the Trial Court's 
findings, but such evidence surely included the testimony of 
Mrs. Myrah and the testimony of Michael Dalley of the Salt 
Lake County health department, cited above. [R. 1847: pp. 
230:14-25, 232:4-233:10.] In particular, the testimony of 
Mr. Dalley establishes that the premises were up to code, 
notwithstanding the arguments of the Campbells at trial. 
Again, the identification of the leases was established by 
requests for admissions that were affirmed by the Trial 
Court at the commencement of the trial. Both leases contain 
an integration clause in paragraph 11 of the original Rental 
Agreement and paragraph 13 of the Renewal Agreement. The 
leases expressly state in paragraph 5 of the Rental 
Agreement and paragraph 7 of the Renewal Agreement that the 
premises were in good and clean condition at the 
commencement of both the first lease and one year later at 
the commencement of the second lease. [R. Plaintiff's 
Exhibits 1 and 2.] 
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Third, there must be a breach of the contract by the 
other party. The record establishes that rent was unpaid 
and that the Campbells left the premises in a state of 
uncleanliness and disrepair. [R. 1629-34, 1848: pp. 564:8-
23, 565:16-22.] The lease agreements also state in 
paragraphs 5 and 9 of the Rental Agreement and paragraphs 2, 
4 and 7 of the Renewal Agreement that it was the 
responsibility of the tenants to maintain the premises in 
good repair and a clean condition. The obligation to pay 
rent, late fees and utilities is set forth in paragraphs 1 
and 6 of the Rental Agreement and paragraphs 1 and 9 of the 
Renewal Agreement. [R. Plaintiff's Exhibits 1 and 2.] 
Fourth, there must be damages resulting from the 
breach. The record establishes that the amount of the 
unpaid rent and late fees were 85.00 for April 2000 and 
1,149.75 for June 2000, unpaid utilities were $122.37, and 
that there were expenses incurred by Mrs. Myrah relative to 
the cleaning and repair of the premises after the Campbells 
vacated. [R. 1629-34, 1848: pp. 564:8-23, 565:16-22.] 
14 
V. MRS, MYRAH WAS THE PREVAILING PARTY AT TRIAL. 
Appellees7 first argument on the issue of the 
prevailing party is that Mrs. Myrah did not establish a 
prima facia case at trial. See Appellees' brief at pages 
21-30 and 32-34. Since the Trial Court ruled that Mrs. 
Myrah had proven her case and awarded damages to her, 
Appellees' first argument depends entirely upon this Court's 
reversal the findings of the Trial Court. If this Court 
does not reverse the findings of the Trial Court, then 
Appellee's first argument fails. 
Appellees' second argument on the issue of the 
prevailing party is that Mrs. Myrah was guilty of discovery 
abuse prior to trial. See Appellees' brief at pages 30-31. 
However, there is nothing in the record to support such a 
conclusion and there is no legal precedent supporting the 
determination of the prevailing party on that basis. 
Appellees cite R.T. Nielsen Co. v. Cook, 2002 UT 11, 40 
P. 3d 1119, for the proposition that the trial court's 
determination of a prevailing party is discretionary. 
However, citing Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 315 
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(Utah 1998), the Court stated, "Whether attorney fees are 
recoverable is a question of law, which we review for 
correctness." Nielsen, supra, at par. 16. The Court 
further stated at par. 23, 
As the court of appeals noted in Mountain States 
Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, "determining the 'prevailing 
party1 for purposes of awarding fees [can oftentimes 
be] quite simple." 783 P.2d 551, 555 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). Where a plaintiff sues for money damages, and 
plaintiff wins, plaintiff is the prevailing party. 
The Court discussed the determination of prevailing party in 
complex cases, such as Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. 
9 
Neale, but such analysis is inapplicable to the present 
case where Mrs. Myrah both received a net judgment on her 
claims3 and prevailed in defeating defendants' 
The other cased cited by Appellee, Carlson Distributing 
Co. v. Salt Lake Brewing Co., LC, 2004 UT App 227, 95 P.3d 
1171, also involved complex circumstances where each party 
prevailed on at least one claim. Mrs. Myrah is not aware of 
any case in which the trial court was given discretion to 
determine that the party who prevailed on all claims was not 
the prevailing party pursuant to the provisions of a 
contract providing for attorneys fees to the prevailing 
party. 
3
 As discussed in the Brief of Appellant, it was improper 
for the Trial Court to offset the rent due for June 2000 
with an equitable adjustment to the rent over the period of 
23 months for which rent was paid. The Trial Courts' motive 
in providing the improper offset and in denying recovery of 
expenses incurred by the landlord for cleaning and repair 
was to form a basis for the denial of attorneys fees to the 
plaintiff as the prevailing party. Given the absence of 
16 
counterclaims. The Court does not have the discretion to 
find there is no prevailing party under the present 
circumstances, as the contract calls for determination of 
one prevailing party. "Where the terms of a contract 
provide for the award of attorney fees, such fees are 
awarded as a matter of legal right." Saunders v. Sharp, 818 
P.2d 574, 579 (Utah App. 1991) (citations omitted). "If 
reasonable fees are recoverable by statute or contract, it 
is a mistake of law to award less than that amount. Id. 
Absent complex circumstances involving multiple claims and 
parties, the net judgment rule is the applicable rule in 
Utah. See Stitching Mayflower v. Newpark Resources, 917 
F.2d 1239, 1248 fn. 9 (10th Cir. 1990) (citing Mountain 
States). The trial court should first apply the net 
judgment rule and only thereafter determine whether it is 
necessary to consider other factors due to complex 
circumstances. See J. Pochynok Co., Inc. v. Smedsrud, 2005 
UT 39 at par. 11 (Utah 2005). Consequently, in the present 
argument from Appellee concerning both the factual and the 
legal issues addressed by the Brief of the Appellant, it 
would seem that the total judgment to Mrs. Myrah should 
increase as a consequence of this Appeal. Nonetheless, even 
without reversing the offset provided by the Trial Court, 
Mrs. Myrah was awarded a positive judgment by the Trial 
Court. 
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case the determination of the prevailing party is "quite 
simple" and left the Trial Court without discretion to hold 
that Mrs. Myrah was not the prevailing party as a matter of 
law. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully requests this Court of Appeals 
dismiss the Campbell's Cross Appeal and direct the Trial 
Court to amend its Judgment to 
a. Increase the cleaning and repair expense awarded 
to the plaintiff based on consideration of the bias created 
by the admission of irrelevant and otherwise inadmissible 
parol evidence by awarding an additional $700.00 for 
cleaning by plaintiff and $1,877.22 for repairs paid to Gus 
Dixon or, in the alternative, order a new trial concerning 
these issues only; 
b. Award plaintiff rent in the amount of $1,095.00 
and a late fee in the amount of $54.75 under the terms of 
the Renewal Agreement for the June 2000 rent and eliminate 
the award of an equitable offset as a matter of law; 
18 
c. Identify plaintiff as the prevailing party 
entitled to costs and attorney1s fees and permit plaintiff 
to submit her statement of costs and attorney's fees 
pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54(d) and 
the express terms of the contract. 
Appellant also respectfully submits that she is 
entitled to her costs and attorneys fees incurred with 
respect to this appeal, pursuant to the terms of the 
contract. 
DATED this Jjl daY o f JulY/ 2006. 
Thor B. Roundy 
Attorney for Appellant 
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